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INTRODUCTION
u The followi
contract number
encompasses the
aspects of the
Solving System.
three domains as
ng is a report
NASW-2572.
conceptual,
development
We categorize
follows:
I. Conceptual Issues
Formulating the distinctive characteristics of the
approach taken by our project in relation to various
studies of cognition and robotics.
H. Experimental Issues
Structurin-I of the vehicle and eye control systems and
defining the information to ba generated by the v'.sual
system.
III. Practical Issues
Continuing support to the JPL robot project	 and
disseminating information about our own project.
These topics are discussed in the following pages, using the
same outline as that given above.
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I. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
u
A. Clarification of our Research Methodology
Our research on the development of a robot computer
problem solving system is relevant to and incorporates ideas
from several different fields of study: computer science,
psychology, control theory, physiology, decision theory, and
so forth. At the same time, our project is suite novel, and
it differs greatly from the sort of research that is
traditional to any one of these fields, e.g. "pure" control
theory or standard cognitive psychology. Because our work
^. is such an unusual combina,-ion of many disci p lines, we have
sometimes found it difficult to communicate our a pproach to
professional people who are accustomed to thinking in terms
of the traditional academic rubrics. The misunderstandings
that have resulted on such occasions have been productive,
because they have forced us to make explicit some of the
assumptions about research methodology that we had formerly
been workinq under without having a clear awareness of them.
	
u	
in this section we will indicate some of the ways that we
	
U	 have been able to characterize our approach, and to relate
it to more conventional methods of research.
Animals vs. Machines
UTho object of our research is an elusive commodity that
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we call "cognitive organization", i.e. those principles of
mental functioning that allow a being to think. But what
kinu of thinking beings are we interested in, animals or
machines? The answer is that in our approach, the two are
inextricably linked. We feel that animals are necessary to
the study of c.)gnition because they provide the only wowing
models of thinking that we know to exist; indeed, people
generally use animal or human behavior to define cognition,
and refuse to attribute the name "thinking" to unnatural
problem solving behavior in machines 	 (e.g.	 the rapid
arithmetic of a desk calculator). On the other hand, we
feel that animal-simulat_ng machines, i.e. robots, are
equally vital to the study of cognition, because they
provide us with new oaths of experimental investigation that
are entirely unavailable to traditional psychology,
be explained shortly. It goes without saying that
machines should also prove to be exceedingly us(
practical applications are not the immediate goal
particular project.
Observation vs. Introspection
Before there were machines with `he potential t
the study of cognitive organization was exclusively
of psychology. The two main avenues of investigate
to psychology are observation and intro
Unfortunately, neither of these a pproaches can c<
I
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near to the issues that concern us in this  project, such as
the representation of spatial experience and the choice of
reasonable but not necessarily optimal actions. Direct
observation of the external behavior of animals or humans
cannot give reliable insight into cognitive organization,
which after all is "in the head." But human introspection,
aside from its many known pitfalls, has access only to
i
`	 "near-conscious" cognition; no adult can give a meaningful
account of how he visually recognizes a chair as such, or
how he knows what to do with his hand when his nose itches.
Thus, the cognitive patterns that we are interested in are
i
precisely those that a y e too thoroughly overlearne:i to be
available to iitrospection.
Given that our object of study lies outsile the reach
of all traditional psychological methodology, our approach
is simply to make the best use possible of whatever
psychology has to offer us. We try to remai; ► abre^ I the
literature of cognitive psychology, and we glean as much
information as we can from our own introspections. Although
these sources do not give us direct information about
cognitive organization, they sometimes can be helpfully
lsuggestive, and sometimes they indicate boundary conditions
I
on the processes that we are looking for, even when they do
i	 not reveal the workings of the processes themselves. 	 (For
example, both observation and introspection make it obvious
l	 that the process of searching perceptual memory is highly
u
	A.	 ;a
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li	
associative, and incredibly more efficient than any search
process known to compute: science; these facts are
important, even though they tell us nothing about how
animate memory search is actually performed.)
1
IAnalysis vs. Synthesis
As we have said, the traditional scientific methods of
psychology are not adequate to reveal the secrets of
cognitive organization, especially at a detailed level. If
we wish to go beyond these analytic a pprct.:hes, we really
I have no choice but to adopt a synthetic technique, i.e. to
build our own cognitive system from scratch. The benefits
of a synthetic approach are several. Its primary advantage
is that the inner workings of any system that we build
ourselves are of course known to us, so there is not the
I'
sort of hornless inaccessibility that limits traditional
!I	
psychology. There is the fact that "getting one's hands
{ dirty" in building something gives one a much better
int-ition about its functioning than does more passive
ohservdtion or armchair contemplation. There is also the
fact that a synthetic approach often forces a 	 clear
t^	
separation between the essential and the irrelevant aspects
ti	 of a phenomenon. For example, mankind was never able to
Uunderstand the flight of birds until he built his own flying
machines and learned that the flapping of the wings was
inessential to winged flight per se. He found that what was
u
u
Page	 7
essential were aerodynamic principles such as lift. with
this new understanding, inan was able to qo back to the
analysis of bird flight, and to work out the proper role of
flapping, which of course is essential for birds.
Similarly, we would hope that once we have built machines
that can exhibit some cognitive behavior, we will have
learned what are the basic	 principles	 of	 cognitive
organization itself (analogc ,js to aerodynamic principles),
and what are the incidental aspects that constitute the
"flapping" of the human mind. Finally, a by-product of the
synthetic approach is that it can produce devices which have
the potential for practical usefulness.
These advantages of the synthetic a pproach do not by
any means imply that the information gained from analytic
science should be ignored. Perhaps it should seem obvious
that analysis and synthesis are to be joined in
collaboration, not in competition, but, unfortunately this
obvious principle has often been violated in the histor y of
machine intelligence. In the old days there was a sort of
hubris that might be ex pressed as "If we can make machines
that add better than humans, we can make machines that think
better than humans!" This attitude has been considerably
damaged in the collision with harsh realities. But a much
more insidious phenomenon is the way in which many synthetic
research projects degenerate into the production of a truly
artificial system which has moved so far away from the
L
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analytic facts of animate cognition that it has little
U
scientific value, while at the same tiis its scientific
pretensions make it too poorly engineered to be of practical
value. We cannot afford to be too critical of this sort of
"degeneration", however, because a fair amount of it is
inevitable in the synthetic approach, as we shall now
explain.
Purity vs Practicability
So far we have said that we attem pt to combine the
ana l is study of cognitive organization in animals and man
with the synthesis of our own mechanical cognitive -system,
our robot. We do strive as hard as we can to keep this
combination "pure", in other words to attempt to make the
robot really be a simulated animal and got a trumped-up
artificial creation with no particular relationship to
animate cognition. But there are two factors that carry us
L
very far from absolute purity in this regard.
The first	 is sim ple	 practicability. For	 example,
Uperceptual memory search in animals	 is	 im plemented in	 brains
C^
containinq millions or	 billions	 of neurons	 acting
simultaneously. This undoubtedly accounts for	 the	 uncanny
11 speed and efficiency of	 such	 search.	 Even	 if we	 understood
the	 logic of	 this kind	 of	 search,	 it would be	 totally
r^
impossible to write	 a simulation	 program for	 present-day
u
u
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^.^	 computers that would run fast enough to be usable. Given
!
the present state if computer science (which includes
tl
programming languages as well as hardware), we very often
are simply forced to cut corners if we want our simulation
I	
to be runnable at all. The best we can do is to note the
!	 places -here we have cut corners, and not attach any
i	 theoretical importance to them.
The second factor is more insidious. It comes from the
fact that the computer programming of our simulation forces
us to an extremely fine level of detail, whereas all the
l	 observationL1 or	 introspective information a-iailable from
{psychology is at an extremely dross, general level. This
means that when the time comes actually to program the
simulation, our means of conceptualizing and implementing
the detailed program are much more closely determined by the
V
computer than they are by any information we may have about
the process we are trying to program! One way of looking at
this is to say that in closing the huge gap between the
synthetic behavior of the program and the analytic
information that we have ds boundary conditions, we are
l	 forced to start from the synthetic side of the gap, which is
i
most unfortunate. This problem is unavoidable, so all we
k
can do is insist that our simulation he as psychologically
i	 realistic as we know how to make it. Also, we as4ume that
ji	 we will have to rewrite the whole simulation over several
u	 times from scratch, with each new version being based on
u
u
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ideas which became clear only through the eventual failure
of the previous version to meet its psychological boundary
conditions.
In summary, our approach to the investigation of
cognitive organization includes paying attention to both
animals and machines, making use of data from both
observation and introspection, combining the advantages of
both the analytic and synthetic methods, and keeping our
system as pure as we can within the constraints of
practicability. This eclecticism is even more difficult to
carry out than it is to explain, but we feel that it is the
only methodology which will lead us to 	 an	 eventual
understanding of the mechanisms of cognition.
B. Functioning of the Visual System
Considerable study has gone 	 into	 the	 design	 of	 the
G
visual	 system	 for	 our	 robot	 simulation,	 and the	 system	 is
still	 under	 revision	 in many respects.	 Many of the problems
U that	 have	 influenced our design of	 the visual system couldy
K be considered to be	 "conceptual	 issues",	 but they	 are	 so
closely	 related	 to	 practical	 considerations that we have
fl derided	 to discuss	 them	 all	 together	 under "Experimental
Issues"	 in	 Section	 II.0 of	 this	 report.0
u
u
I	 i
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II. EXPERIMENTAL ISSUES
A. Perspective on our Development of the world Simulation
^J As we suggested in Section I..A, the development of our
robot simulation program has to proceed literally from the
g r ound u : we first implement a Martian terrain environment9 r 	P	 P
then the physical robot and its sensori-motor system, then
L^
the physics (forces And movement) in this world, then the
primitive sensory operations	 ...	 and finally on to the
i
perceptual and higher cognitive operations. In the past, we
have tended to view this simulation as being made up of t••io
distinct parts, whose boundary is indicated by the in
the previous sentence; that is, the environment, physics,
motor, and sensory systems were considered to be the "world
i
Simulation" and the perceptual and problem-:,olving system:;
were considered to be the "Cognitive Simulation".
U As our work on the simulation has p rogressed, we have
U
come to doubt if this kind of dichotomy can be maintained.
There are two tendencies we have discovered which suggest
Lthat our simulation will be much more homoyene)us than we
had originally envisioned it. The first is that we are
r
	
U	 never able to find boundary lines among what we imagined to
	
4 (i	 be the separate components of the system.	 The worldY U
k	 interacts with the motor system, which interacts with the
physics, which interacts with the sensory system, and so on.
iu
i
u
u
u
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"Sensation" is presumed to be physical, and "perception" is
presumed to be cognitive, but certainly these two concepts
are merged even in theory, so that in a practical simulation
they become in.;eparable.
The second phenomenon that we have encountered is that
when lie discover a shortcoming at any level in the
simulation (and the whole pur pose of this research project
is to discover the limitations and extensions of our current
knowledge), to eliminate that shortcoming often reauiren
revising much of the whole simulation. For example, we
originr. 7	had limited the robot to a fixed, polygonal path
thrc"4h the environment. Later we decided that this,
be:3ides being unrealistic, did not give the robot sufficient
freedom to make an interesting choice or actions, so we
removed the idea of a restricted path. But then, we had to
change the robot's motor system to allow it to mo— in
curves s well as in straight segments. we also had to give
physical pro perties to mountains, hills, and crater rims, so
that the robot would bump into them and stop, rather than
passing right through them as it would have in the in_tial
simulation. But then, since it could bum p into these edges,
the robot had to be able to see the edges as well, which was
not included in the original visual system. But then, since
the mountains, hills, and so forth now had physical and
visual reality, we had to solve the difficult problem of
simulating the visual occlusion of one object by another
iPage 13
ol)ject in front of it.
Now, all of these extensive revisions to the "world
simulation" arose because of a singlL change (dropping the
fixed path), whose primary motivation was not physical
realism, but cognitive realism (i.e. that the robot should
have a lot of choices to make about where it might go). It
is perhaps worth pointing out toe that these changes arose
purely from the theoretical considerations of our research,
and in no wise from technical considerations of computer
implementability. Indeed, these changes were discussed
explicitly in last year "s proposal to this contract ...
where we asserted Uiat we would not be making them because
they were too difficult to program!
In summary, we have come to see our robot simulation as
a single evolving entity whose various aspects are closely
1
	
	
interrelated. Since we expect this to be an experimental
program where we will often try out ideas that tern out to
[	 be unsuccessful, we must expect in consequence that we will
be	 continually	 revamping	 our simulation, even those
LI
"lower-level" aspects such as the "world simulation" which
had seemed to reach a stable level of development. Needless
L
to say, the kinds of changes we will b y making will seldom
involve	 scrapping whole churks of our simulation and
U
reworking them de novo; rather, they will be revisions and
additions	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 greater realism or
u
I
u
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sophistication. The descriptions of our current work in the
remainder of this section clearly show that ire have put in
I
much that is new, while retaining many of our original
	
^I	
ideas.
B. Improvements to the Simulation
I
Most of our previous work on robot problem solving has
centered on activities which relate to the visual perception
of objects. Our work on tracking an object has been the
single exception to this, since it was necessary to
coordinate the motion of the robot's body with the motion o°
its eye. Because our interest at that time was primarily in
tho perceptual aspects of i.obot problem solving, we chose to
restrict t e motion of the robot to a well-definei path so
that we could temporarily ignore both the conceptual and
practical problems of implementing a complete motor control
system. As a result of this simplification, we have come to
a point in our understanding of robot problem solving where
I
we are ready to allow the robot to set out on its own,
making decisions about where it is to go. In order to allow
it to do this, we completely redefined the robot's motion
control system which, paradoxically, got us embroiled right
back in issues of vinual perception, as described in
Section II.A. Thus, in this section we describe the newly
completed robot body and eye motion control systems and in
	
C ll	 the next section we discuss areas that ace only partially
0
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U	 complete which in- , olve the type of information which is to
H	 be generated by the visual system.
Vehicle Motion Control
Before we could specify the physics of a vehicle
control system, it was necessary to define what kinds of
lactions we wanted the vehicle to perform. We decided upon a
set of essentially car-like properties that allow the robot
to go forward and backward at any chosen speed (but within
' specified limits) and to turn in both directions. The
sinqle non-car-like property is that we wanted the robot to
be able to turn in place about its center point. The reason
for this is not so much conceptual in nature, but rather is
a result of the mathematics for simulatinq the oath taken by
the rob^it.	 (Here is a good examr)le of the Purity vs.
Practicability dilemma mentioned in Section I.A. In order
to make *he simulation run in a reasonable amount of time,
we chose to approximate the robot's (conceptually) curved
path with a sequence of short straight line segments. 	 But
L► 	
doing this could result in some anomalies when operating
very close to the edge of a terrain object.	 Since these
Uanomalies could get us into trouble with the cognitive
system later o ,.i, we chose to eliminate them by making the
robot's motion a turn-then-move operation, which leads to
the turn-in-place characteristic of the simulated vehicle.)
u
L
J
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The parameters to the vehicle control system consist of
two velocities -- a forward velocity and a turning velocity.
Either velocity can have positive or negative values to
indicate direction. The interpretatiot, of the velocities is
that they are desired velocities. The vehicle control
system will use these velocities to alter the behavior of
the vehicle within the limits allowed.	 For	 instance,	 in
order to allow for the effects of a bound on maximur,i
acceleration and deceleration without introducing the
clumsiness of control using acceleration, the rate of change
of velocity is limited. So also is the maximum positive and
negative velocity that is allowed to be reached. Thus, if
thn vehicle is going forward (a positive velocity) and the
control system is given a negative velocity as a parameter,
the vehicle will gradually slow down, reverse direction,
then gradually speed up until it reaches the desired
negative velocity; unless the parameter es.ceeds the maximum
negative velocity allowed, in which case the vehicle will
maintain that maximum and no more.
Another aspect of the vehicle motion control system
which we have programmed is that of feedback of information
to higher-level systems. For instance, if the vehicle has
bimped into an object, that fact should be reported along
with information about where on the robot the hit took
place. So far, we are uncertain (both from a conceptual and
practical viewpoint) as to what vehicle control feedback
u
u
u
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7	 information will be important later on. Therefore, we are
making all infor &tioa available that we think might be
us(.ful. This includes: the actual X and Y position of the
robot in the world; the vehicle's actual forward and turning
velocity; and whether the robot has hit or crashed into any
object.
Notice that we have stated to develop a hierarchy of
control.	 The vehicle takes "turn-then-move" commands from
	
1
	
the control system.	 The control system takes desired
velocities from some higher level system not yet completely
defined, but which we view as the Lensori-motor system. We
envision the sen.sori-motor system 3s receiving com-nanJs such
as "go faster" from the cognitive system. 'Thus, our work on
vehicle control is more than sim ply a redefinition of how
the vehicle will work, but it is a synthesis of the
conceptual ideas generated during the earlier phases of our
project. A similar phenomenon holds for the visual system.
Eye Motion Control
As a result of our conce p tual work, the visual system
has changed in detail somewhat (See Section II.C), but the
control parameters themselves have remained the same. These
	
u
	
are: the angular position of the eve relative to the center
line of the robot; the focal distance; the angular width of
	
u	 vision; and the depth of vision. The last two parameters
u
0
I	 i	 i
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11	 are specified by simply giving a value, and changes are
IJ
assumed to be instantaneous.
^I	
The first two parameters are more complex. They can be
U	 specified by providing either positional information (as
i with the last two parameters) or by specifying a (positive
or negative) velocity which the eye is to achieve. -he
reason for the two modes of control is that there are cases
[	
where each seems conceptually correct.
	
sometimes it is
desirable to look in a particular direction and for this,
II	 positional control is required. Other times, such as in the
t!
tracking of an object, it is desirable to be able to move
r
toe eye at a certain speed and for this, velocit y
 control is
used. Regardless of which mode of control iF used, however,
the repositioning and refocusing of the eye is limited by a
maximum velocity and maximum change in velocity in a manner
similar to the parameters controlling the vehicle. Thus, if
t' the eye is stopped in a position to the far left of the
robot and the positional parameter is specified for the far
right, this change will not take place instantaneously, but
i^	 rcther at a pace determined by the established limits.
L
V
As	 with the	 vehicle system, certain feedback
information will	 be	 returned which indicates	 the current
U
state of	 the eye.	 Much more	 important though	 is the visual
information actually	 returned by the eye.	 We at one	 time
had	 this problem solved,	 but	 as a	 result of	 redefinition of
t
..s.64M,
1
rPage 19
the visual system, the exact information returned by the eye
is still an open question wnich we will now discuss.
L1	
C. Work in Progress: The Visual System
The work we are doing at pres^nt centers around
P.
redesigning the robots visual system. As we pointed ou, in
Section II.A, an aspect of our simulation often reveals
avenues for improvement after only a limited amount of
tc.stinq, and in this spirit we are incorporating many new
ideas into the revised visual syster., based on our experience
with the old one.
. _
Geometry of toe Visual Field
u
u
') u
I^u
The visual field has been redefined to include a
central region ind a peripheral region. The peripheral
region is essential'_ the region within which lateral, near,
and far vision takes place, and the central region is where
foveal vision takes place. The peripheral region spans an
area approximately 70 degrees to each side of the direction
in which the robot is looking, and from a few inches in
front of the robot to the horizon. The central region has
essentially the same external geometry as our old complete
eye and is located along the center line of the peripheral
region and completely within it. The eye control parameters
discussed in Section II.B all apply to the central region
u
-71
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and do not effect the peripheral region except to change the
position of its center line. Aside from rotating along with
the eye, its size does not change.
The reasons fo the change to the geometry of the
visual field stem trc the fact that certain anomalies arose
with the old system which were a direct result of the
peripheral fields becoming small. t as the e •, , e focl:t:ed down
on an object. It was possible, for instance, to be focused
on a distant mountain and not see a nearby hill that was in
the direct path from the robot tj the mountain. It was also
possible to be so focused down on an object that the
peripheral field of view oas esscntiall y non-existent.	 No
such anomalous cases exist with the new visual system.
We will now discuss the sensory aspect of the eye, i.e.
what it sees, and we will concern ourselves cnly with vision
in the central region. The visual properties of the
peripheral field remain to be worked out, but are sure to be
quite simple compared with the finely-structured sensory
U information brought in by the central field.
u
Levels of Processing
U
If we examine the Physiology of vertebrate vision, we
find that it is quite fallacious to imagine that a single
sensory entity, "the eye" sends some simple commodity called
u	 "visual	 information"	 to a single entity,	 "the brain".
F
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Rather, we find that there are many distinct processing
stations which operate on the visual image, starting with
more than one integrative layer in the retina itself. Thus,
there is no single answer to the questions "What does the
eye see?" or "What visual information does the brain
v^ceive?", but rather there are many successive levels of
assimilation, starting at the retina and ending in the
cortex.
If we look at vision psychologically rather than
physiologically,	 our	 conclusion	 is	 just	 the same.
Psychologists	 sometimes	 for	 convenience	 consider
"sensations" to be light-meter-like readin g s sent b y the
eye, and "perceptions" to be analytical interpretations of
the sensations as made by the brain, but in truth this
distinction is fictional. All we really know is that light
rays go into the eyes, and cognitive interpretations arise
in the brain, and that a lot of processing has gone on in
between.
This	 conclusion applies	 to	 vision	 in	 our	 robot
u simulation	 model,	 and it raises difficulties	 for	 us.	 We
Ll
cannot simply have a program called "the	 eye"	 which	 takes
simulated	 light	 as input and gives	 simulated	 "vision"	 as
Loutput --	 because	 this wo,'-1 be	 unrealistic,	 and	 probably
u^workable	 as	 well. This means	 that	 we must	 set up an
explicit	 hierarchy of visual processing.	 This	 is	 an onerous
u
u
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to use as design criteria
little help because the
is not understood in the
demands, and physiology
robots eye is after all
ions are not at all like
task because we have very little
beyond intuition: psychology is of
Psychology of visual processing
kind of detail thzt our simulation
is of little hel n because our
artifj -ial. and its pi:mary operat
those of the vertebrate retina.
As matters stand, we have not yet decided upon the
precise levels of visual processing to be used in our model.
This fact will lend a certain vagueness to the rest of the
discussions in this section, since we are as yet undecided
as to what processing will be clone where. All such
decisions will of course be forced by the process of
programming the new visual system.
The Seeing of Point Objects
In previous reports we have noted that the robot's
Martian environment contains a large number of rocks and
"unidentified objects", which we collectively call pointU objects.	 We have explained that we have nut point objects
U
in the robot's world in order to experiment with the
recognition of a scene on the basis of constellations of
individual objects, where the process of perceiving each
n
individual object is not particularly interesting, i.e. 	 is
u	 particularly simple. What is this simple process of seeing
U
0
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point objects?
'I Briefly, a point object is seen as a list of
attribute-value pairs associated with a geometric point
location. Intuitively speaking, a rock might be seen as
I	 "Color-Gray at R-Theta, Texture-Rough at R-Theta, ...". 	 In
I
the old visual system, the polar coor ,'inates of the point
object with respect to the eye were not reported directly,
but rather were sorted into one of 15 visual subfields. 	 We
have	 felt	 this pre-sorting to be an undue a-priori
i
restriction on the in put, and in the new visual system, the
R-Theta co)rdinates themselves will be reported, at least at
the lowest levels.	 We	 are	 considering	 introducing
pseudo-random	 error into the radial coordinate, since
vertebrate vision is not very precise as to ranging. 	 (In
()
	
	
angular measurement, at least relative measurement, the
human eye is so accurate that we may consider it errorless.)
L1 A,	 in	 the	 old system,	 not	 all the	 possible
LI
attribute-value	 pairs of	 a point object	 g ill necessarily be
seen at once.
	
Several factors	 will	 determine what	 is	 seen
1
1 at	 any	 given	 time. Different	 attributes have different
visibilities
	 (e.g.	 it is easier	 to	 see	 a	 rock's color	 than
LJ its	 texture).
	
Different values	 sometimes have different
u
visibilities	 (e.g.	 it is easier	 to	 see	 a	 red rock	 than	 a
gray	 one).	 Near	 objects are easier	 to	 see than	 far	 ones.
Objects near
	
the very center of	 the visual	 field	 (the	 fovea)
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are much easier to see than those near the periphery.
Obiects or attribute-pairs that the system is intentionally
lookin3 for are easier to see than those which are received
by accident (Ois feature will be a new addition to the
visur.l system) .	 Also, there is a notion of "focusin,I" or
"concentration" .+hick allows one object to be seen in more
and more detail, while all others are seen less and less
fully. This factor, which in the current system is part of
the initial selection of which attribute-value pairs are
seen, may in the new s ystem be moved to a later level of
processinq, since it is more a mental operation than a
visual one.	 Finally, we are consi•_jerinq	 including	 a
probability-directed	 pseudo-ransom	 choice as to which
attribute-value pairs are soon at Pnv given time, since the
same object never really looks the same in any two
encounters, no mattes !p ow similar the visual circumstances
may be.
We might mention that the actual attribute-value pairs
we will use will not be semantically meaningful, such as
"Color-Gray", but rather will be sim ple codes with numerical
values, such as "3-6". This sort of coding is realistic,
inasmuch as the signals involved in the lower levels of our
visual systems certainly are quantitative, and certainly do
not involve English words. In ou: model, we can exneriment
with various spatial snd probability distributions in the
assignment of value3 to the attributes of in-lividual point
0
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objects.	 This can give rise to various situations of
psychological interest, e.g. a constellation of rocks all
of more-or-less the same "F-attribute", or a single
unidentified object whose "D-attribute" value is markedly
different from all the rest.
So much for the considerations that enter into the
"simple" case of point object vision,
The Seeing of Terrain Objects
Along with point objects, the robot's environment
cantains a landing nodule (formerly a point object),
craters, hills, and mountains, all of w-iich ara coll.sctively
known as terrain objects. Terr,-in object:, are oolvgonal,
and their vertices are essentially a class of ooint objects,
so we will not concern ourselves primarily with the seeing
of the vertices in this discussion. What concerns us here
is the manner in which terrain objL,its are to be seen as
connected wholes, i.e. (in effect) the seeing of the edges
which join the vertices into connected, spatially-ext^nled
structures. We will ignore here the auestion of whether the
edges of terrain objects have attribute-value pairs of their
own (a matter which shoul;l be easily handleable by analogv
with point objects), and concentrate on the simple ouestion
of how the eye might see whether or not two terrain vertices
^-ire in fact joined by an edge, i.e. whether or not they are
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successive vertices of the same object. This question,
though simple to state, gives rise to many complexities, and
we are only part way toward answering it fully.
Our first assumption is that there is some ranee R such
that if the two points are within distance R of the robot,
the eye can always sense their true connectivity (i.e.
whether they are joined by an edge or not), just as though
t connectivity were a directly-visible nroperty. This
assum ption models the fact that vertebrate visual systems
can make use of a wide range of subtle s patial clues, such
^-^	 Is textural9 radients, shadows, parallax, and so forth, si
i,	 as to correctly see the connectivit y of two points.	 Rather
u
than trying to introduce all of these fine details into our
i^
	
	
simul3t ion , we gill .simply sum un their net result, which is
that connectivity is effectively a directly-visibI n property
LI	 at close r.anle. We are not saying
	
nthat this rage R is a
constant, but simply that fog an y two point objects one can
L1
	
	
c,imnute an R, and if they fall within it, perce ption of
connectivit y ceases to be a problem.
UOutside of R, it remains a problem.	 Doubtless the
of	 distant points cannot	 be	 detected with
r1
connectivity
u certainty, but	 rather	 most be reported	 in	 terms	 of
ij confidence values,	 e.g. 0-100%. This means that we now
^j must deal not only with	 "sensations" but	 also with	 "sensory
hypotheses" (this	 problem arises, but	 much more	 wr	 ,y,	 in
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the case of error in the detectio n. cf the radial position of
point objects). At what level of visual proses,inq are such
i
hypotheses to be stored, checked out, or revised? This we
have not yet worked out.
The criteria on which the visual system might
hypothesize that two terrain vertices are connected are at
least:
1. S patial proximity
2. Similarit y of features
3. Sighting of an edge that might join them
(We do not yet even have a potential list of the criteria cn
which the system might hvpothesize the two vertices to be
l dis-connecte-1; this is a trickier problem, which might even
involve higher cognitive orocessinq.) The first two of these
criteria can be judge9 by closeness ne3surec which shoull be
relativel y straightforward. We will only sal further about
them that if we introduce pseu0o- ran dom error into the
initia' :detection of the -ortices, then these measures may
lead to erroneous conclusions. This is a valid simulation
^ I
	
	of the fact, thc,t fir exam ple, two overla pp ing mountains on
the horizon might n rppear to run together into one, since theIJ
distance separating them might not be detectable at that
LI range.
l^ The Problems come in criterion 3, "sighting of a erlge
that might join" the two vertices in question. First of
all, we have not yet fully decided on the visual oror)erties
0
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of edges, but certainly their spatial orientation is not
directly sensible. This fact can lead to situations in
which the robot cannot visually distinguish between two
similar terrain configurations, e.g. cannot see whether a
gap is reall y a pass, or just a cove. This sort of
ambiguit evidently is perfectly a ppropriate if the robot is
sufficiently far away from the terrain in question. our
;problems are how the robot should report a sensory
ambiguity, how it should store it, and at what level of
processing it should work at resolving the ambiguity.
In sum, the major difference between our new visual
system and the old is that the new version will addtc!rs the
problem of perceiving terrain objects as connected surfaces.
This is certainly an interesting issue in nerceotual
psychologv, and an im portant facet of the robots abilit y to
comprehend its envir^inment.
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III. PRACTICAL ISSUES
Our work with the JPL Robot Project has continued with
our assuming a consultinq role on the issues of nat-h
planning algorithm, ground system c'evelooment, and overall
system design. Durinq several tri ps to JPL we have hen
pleased to discover that many of our recommendations have
been implemented and that the project is showing definite
accom plishment. Our most recent tri p to JPL coincided with
the	 International	 Teiemetering	 Conference,	 where we
presented the paver "Ex perientially Guided Robots". This
paper is a summarization of the work we have done on this
contract including a list cf some of the interestini
unsolved Droblems. It was chosen as one of ten pavers to be
published in the Telemetry Journal as cepresentative of the
cc,nference.
